

Contents

Preface	VII
Contents	XI
List of Tables and Figures	XIX
List of abbreviations	XXI

Part One

"Orthodox" siting

Chapter One

Global plans and local pains: The misfortune of "orthodox" siting

I. "Orthodox" siting	1
A. López Ostra v. Spain	1
B. "Orthodox" criteria for the siting of hazardous waste facilities	2
1. Profitable, functional, safe, and legal	2
2. Public opposition	4
II. Global plans cause local pains	5
A. Technical solutions and social distress	6
1. The ideology of environmental efficiency	6
2. Local burdens	7
3. The ideology of environmental compassion	9
B. Waste grows, waste flows: Distributing environmental burdens	11
1. Efficiency and compassion	11
2. "Principles of Environmental Justice"	12
3. The World Bank memo	13
III. Stereotyping siting disputes: The language of somewhere, elsewhere, and nowhere	14
A. LULUs and NIMBYs	15
1. LULU	15
2. NIMBY	16
B. "Environmental racism" and the environmental justice movement	17
1. Injustice or misfortune?	17
2. The charge of environmental racism	18
3. Ultimately unjust?	19
4. "... a threat to justice everywhere ..."	21
IV. Alternative approaches to the siting of hazardous waste facilities	22
A. Siting disputes as social conflict	22
1. Power, misfortunes, and improvements	22
2. "The Facility Siting Credo"	24
B. Benefit sharing	26
C. Risk communication	29
1. Risk perception and the social amplification of risk	29
2. Risk communication and trust	30

D. Consensus building	32
1. Distributional disputes	32
2. Negotiation and mediation	33
V. The resilience of "orthodox" siting policy	36

Chapter Two

LULUs and the law: Legal institutions and facility siting

I. The legal framework for the siting of hazardous waste facilities	37
A. Regulation as balance between conflicting interests	37
1. Interests and rights	37
2. Restrictions on property	38
a) Private law restrictions	39
b) Public law restrictions	40
c) Limits to regulatory power	40
B. Facility siting as a legal problem	42
1. In search of the law	42
2. Legal institutions	44
C. Sources of law	45
D. The environmental bias	47
1. Predominance of environmental law	47
2. Policy background	48
a) The credo of public waste management	48
b) An illustration: The "greening" of Europe	49
E. Siting as individual development	51
1. Individual project	51
2. Definition of development	51
a) Land use, technology use, and purpose	52
b) Hazardous waste treatment	53
3. Siting as the right to develop a facility	54
II. Siting as permitting	54
A. The permit system	54
1. Concept of the permit system	56
2. Siting agencies	58
3. General elements of a permit system	58
B. Permit requirements	60
C. Permit procedure	60
1. An illustration: Procedures for the RCRA permit program	60
a) Application	60
b) Review of application	61
c) Draft permit	61
d) Public notice, public comment, and public hearing	62
e) Preparation of final decision	62
2. Elements of the permit procedure	62
a) "Agere pro actus"	63
b) Application	64
c) Publicity	65
d) Preparation of decision	67
D. Permit standards	67
1. Permit standards as a "blueprint"	68
2. Risk prevention	68
a) Risk prevention as permit standard	68
b) Risk prevention and siting	71

E.	Permit decision	72
1.	Issuance or denial of permit	72
2.	Effects of the permit	73
a)	General effects	73
b)	Permit shield	73
3.	Terms and conditions	74
4.	Administrative and judicial review of the permit decision	74
F.	Enforcement of the permit system	77
III.	Risk and safety as legal concepts	78
A.	Safety, risk, and ordinary meaning	79
1.	Damage and probability	79
2.	Trapped in the corridors of safety	80
B.	The legal discourse on risk and safety	82
1.	Six elements of risk and safety	83
2.	Language games	85
C.	"Surrogate safety"	86
1.	Is it really safe?	86
2.	"Surrogate safety" and siting	87
IV.	How legal institutions are supposed to resolve LULU conflicts	88

Part Two

Wasting trust

Chapter Three

East Liverpool, Ohio: A case study in incinerator siting

I.	The case of the East Liverpool (Ohio) hazardous waste incinerator	89
A.	More "story" than "facts"	89
B.	Key events	90
II.	Successful siting?	92
A.	A one-stop disposal mall	92
B.	"... minimal potential for adverse consequences"	93
C.	State of West Virginia v. State of Ohio	93
D.	Years of silence	95
III.	Civil disobedience	95
A.	Under construction	95
B.	Unpleasant questions	96
C.	Necessary trespass?	97
D.	Mini burn	99
E.	Minor adjustments	101
IV.	The promise	102
A.	"Rightfully concerned ..."	102
B.	A national controversy	103
C.	Test burn permits	104
V.	"... imminent and substantial endangerment ..."	105
A.	Risk testimony	105
B.	Greenpeace v. Waste Technologies Industries — The District Court	108
C.	"... the best hazardous waste incinerator in the world ..."	109
VI.	The test	110
A.	"... the most responsible way possible"	110
B.	Calling the White House	111

C.	Palumbo v. Waste Technologies Industries	111
D.	Limited commercial operation	112
E.	"Right tools, wrong stacks!"	113
F.	The "Investigative Report" of the Ohio Attorney General	114
G.	The "Yard-a-Pult"	116
VII.	Behind the permit shield	117
A.	Greenpeace v. Waste Technologies Industries — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit	117
B.	"... WTI prevails ..."	119
C.	One year after the promise	120
D.	"Issues Pertaining to an Incinerator in East Liverpool, Ohio" — The report of the US General Accounting Office	121

Chapter Four

"Whatever it takes": A review of the case study

I.	"... the focus of national attention"	123
A.	Siting trouble	123
1.	On the fringe	123
2.	The siting issue	124
B.	The longevity of conflict	127
C.	Monolithic disagreement	128
1.	No easy answers	128
2.	Tragic disagreement	130
3.	Miscommunication	131
II.	The rationalities of the participants	133
A.	Four groups of participants	133
B.	The developer	136
1.	The rationality of liberty	136
2.	The rhetoric of liberty	139
C.	The government	142
1.	The rationality of control	142
2.	The rhetoric of control	145
D.	The opponents	148
1.	The rationality of distrust	148
2.	The rhetoric of distrust	152
III.	The elements of "Whatever It Takes"	156
A.	A failure of "orthodox" assumptions	156
B.	A social, not a technical problem	157
1.	Risk allocation	157
2.	Risk distribution	159
C.	Not just two stakeholders	161
D.	Rationalities are not interests	163
1.	Conflicting interests	163
2.	Conflicting rationalities	164
E.	The wrong questions	166
1.	"Orthodoxy" as weakness	166
2.	Not asking the right questions	167
F.	Legal institutions failed	168
1.	To avoid or to delay	168
2.	Inefficient, uncertain, and unjust	169
G.	Wasting trust	171

Part Three

Optimal pollution

Chapter Five

Salus populi suprema lex: Cooperation as a social virtue

I. Warre, Common-wealth, and Leviathan	173
A. LULU blockage as metaphor	173
B. "... that great Leviathan called a Common-wealth ..."	174
II. The virtue of social cooperation	177
A. The utilitarian nature of public interests	177
B. Regulating hazardous activities	178
III. Rational cooperation	182
A. Prisoner's Dilemma	182
1. Basic assumptions	182
a) How are we supposed to coexist?	182
b) Keeping the backyard clean	183
2. Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma	186
3. A viable strategy: "Nice, forgiving, and retaliatory"	187
4. Sophisticated cooperation	189
B. Foundations of cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma	192
1. More than one player	192
2. Incompatible best preferences	192
3. Advantages of cooperation	194
4. Individual rationality	195
IV. Building and destroying cooperation	197
A. How to improve or reduce the chance of cooperation	197
1. Efficiency and justice in the Prisoner's Dilemma	197
2. What makes cooperation more likely, or less?	198
B. Modified distribution of utility	200
1. Poised to cooperate	200
2. Poised to defect	201
C. Auxiliary parameters for mutual cooperation	203
1. Iterations, and time	203
2. Trust	205
3. Information and perception	207

Chapter Six

Leviathan's dilemma: Cooperation as a social vice

I. Rational cooperation and the design of legal institutions	210
A. Public interests and the social contract	210
1. Conceiving government	211
a) Legendary tensions	211
b) "Policey"	212
c) "A well constructed Union"	213
2. Public interests and social contract doctrine	214
a) A figure of speech	214
b) Social contract doctrine and the theory of cooperation	215
c) Trading liberty for property: The social contract according to Locke	216
B. Public interests and the contractarian government	219
1. Leviathan's task	219

2. Trust	220
a) Two tiers of "trust"	220
b) Trust and the allocation of benefits and burdens	222
3. The contractarian Prisoner's Dilemma	225
II. The "guards and fences" of risk prevention	226
A. From private law to public law	226
B. Pollution control: Effective or efficient?	229
1. Pollution and utility	229
2. Externalities and efficiency	232
III. Cooperation as a social vice	236
A. Distributing "efficiently" controlled pollution	236
1. A likely location	236
2. "Cerrell communities"	237
B. What is wrong with environmental efficiency?	239
1. Wasteful efficiency	239
2. Some effects of law on LULU and NIMBY disputes	241

Part Four

A legion of injustice

Chapter Seven

Pure and simple justice

I. Justice and legitimacy	243
A. Endorsement, skepticism, or diversity	243
B. Justice as a symbol	245
II. The machine of planning	246
A. Efficient planning	246
1. Needs and chances	247
2. The supreme plan	250
B. A planner's dilemma	250
1. Identical planning gains	251
2. Shopping for arguments	253
C. Why justice?	255
III. The strong, the most, and the poor: Three concepts of justice	255
A. Distributing benefits and burdens	255
1. Choosing justice	256
2. A planner's dilemma: The socioeconomic version	258
B. The strong: Elitist justice	258
1. Individual liberty	259
2. Market justice	261
C. The most: Utilitarian justice	261
1. Common good and public interests	261
2. Utility	263
D. The poor: Social justice	263
1. Defying the oppressor	264
2. "Justice as fairness"	266
E. Choosing justice?	266
IV. Reactions to concepts of pure and simple justice	268
A. Ambiguity	268
1. Concealed justice	268
2. Ambiguity and equality	269

3. Equality and burdens	270
4. Resisting ambiguity	272
B. Nullity	273
1. Realism and positivism	273
2. Craving for justice	275
C. Reversal	276

Chapter Eight

"It's just . . . unfair!": Essential injustice

I. Injustice	278
A. Broken promises	278
B. The energy of injustice	280
C. Inevitable injustice	282
II. The Scales of the Baleks	286
A. A tale of injustice	286
B. Reading tales of injustice	287
1. Equality	287
2. Simple and essential injustice	288
3. Essential injustice: A view from the village	290
4. Essential injustice: A view from the manor-house	293
5. Essential injustice: A view from the city hall	295
III. A farewell to <i>Totenreich</i>	297
A. Some side effects of justice	297
1. Essential injustice is inevitable	297
2. The legacy of purity	298
B. We and they	300
1. Our idea of justice is their idea of injustice	300
2. A "chaotic jumble"	302

Part Five

Justice as compassion

Chapter Nine

Other justices, other rationalities

I. The tribes are unhappy	305
A. Why me?	305
B. The plight of Chagga men	308
C. Just pollution	309
II. Myths and values	314
A. "Risk is a collective construct"	314
B. Tribes of political cultures	315
1. Some trouble with pigs	315
2. The four types of cultural theory	318
a) Fatalists, individualists, communards, and hierarchists	318
b) The formation of values and preferences	319
C. Tribal profiles	320
1. The culture of irrelevance	320
2. The culture of liberty	321
3. The culture of distrust	322
4. The culture of control	324

III. Tribal warfare	325
A. Some trouble with tribes	325
1. Mutual accusations	325
2. Expecting trouble	327
a) Impossibility theorem	327
b) Efficient pollution control and bounded rationality	328
B. The non-Madisonian structure of tribal warfare	329
1. "Divided We Stand"	329
2. Tribal interactions	332
C. Social limits to "efficient pollution control"	334
1. Entrenchment: The struggle between markets and bureaucracies	334
2. The exclusion of communards	335
a) Backyards out of place	335
b) How markets and bureaucracies fail to acknowledge relationships	337
3. The exclusion of fatalists	338
a) Waste generation	338
b) Passive injustice	339
c) How markets and bureaucracies fail to make polluters pay	340

Chapter Ten

Junk justice: When one size just does not fit all

I. No easy cure for the plight of Chagga men	341
A. A model of diversity	341
B. Victims are not saviors	343
1. Utilizing other justices, other rationalities	346
2. Entrenchment and the accumulation of essential injustice	348
II. Environmental compassion	348
A. Boxes of injustice	348
1. The Ghost of Social Contracts	350
2. Minimizing injustice	350
a) Highly and moderately unjust social arrangements	352
b) Not pure, not abominable, and not merely a weak compromise	353
B. Viable social arrangements	353
1. Ragpicking for justice	353
2. Criteria for recognizing a viable social arrangement	354

Notes	357
Bibliography	458
Index	501

List of Tables and Figures

Table 1:	The Facility Siting Credo	25
Table 2:	Total and per capita benefits/costs	27
Table 3:	Interests and rights	38
Table 4:	Systems of governmental interventions	55
Table 5:	Siting agencies	57
Table 6:	Permit standards	69
Table 7:	Administrative and judicial review	76
Table 8:	Probability and damage	80
Table 9:	Elements of risk (safety)	83
Table 10:	<i>Ex ante</i> examination of siting issue	124
Table 11:	<i>Ex post</i> examination of siting issue	126
Table 12:	Monolithic disagreement	130
Table 13:	Monolithic miscommunication	132
Table 14:	Three "active" groups	135
Table 15:	The "passive" group	136
Table 16:	"The developer"	137
Table 17:	"The government"	144
Table 18:	"The opponents"	149
Table 19:	Assumptions and lessons	156
Table 20:	Issues of the WTI controversy	164
Table 21:	Mutual disappreciation	166
Table 22:	When legal institutions fail	170
Table 23:	Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma	186
Table 24:	Improving or reducing cooperation	199
Table 25:	Likely and unlikely locations	238
Table 26:	The machine of planning	249
Table 27:	A dilemma	250
Table 28:	A shopping list for planners	253
Table 29:	The strong, the most, and the poor	256
Table 30:	Three concepts of justice	267
Table 31:	Tactics for coping with essential injustice	284
Table 32:	How political cultures influence mutual perceptions	326
Table 33:	"The problem"—according to the tribes	327
Table 34:	Archetypal stakeholders	349
Figure 1:	Risk allocation	158
Figure 2:	Risk distribution	160
Figure 3:	Hobbesian "naturall condition"	176
Figure 4:	Regulating hazardous activities	179
Figure 5:	Keeping the backyard clean	184
Figure 6:	Prisoner's Dilemma	185
Figure 7:	Unsymmetrical payoffs	190
Figure 8:	Poised to cooperate	200
Figure 9:	Poised to defect	201
Figure 10:	A siting dilemma	204
Figure 11:	Differently valuable land uses	206
Figure 12:	Leviathan's blueprint	230
Figure 13:	A market for noxious facilities	233
Figure 14:	Externalities	234
Figure 15:	Using other backyards	239
Figure 16:	Four myths of risk and pollution	317
Figure 17:	The four types of cultural theory	318
Figure 18:	Entrenchment of "efficient pollution control"	335
Figure 19:	Entrenchment of "fair pollution control"	345